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Does Europe Need a Comprehensive Energy 
Policy?
The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima has given renewed momentum to the anti-nuclear power 
movement across Europe. However, the degree of momentum varies greatly from country to 
country, and considering the geographically widespread consequences of a nuclear accident, 
it hardly appears optimal for one country to ban nuclear power while multiple nuclear power 
plants are still active in neighbouring countries. Even beyond the nuclear power dilemma, the 
economic and political externalities associated with energy policy are diffi cult to overstate. 
The contributions to this Forum look into the benefi ts expected from a comprehensive 
common energy policy for Europe and the problems which establishing such a policy would 
involve.
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The Future of EU Energy Policy after Fukushima
Successive attempts by the European Commission and 
some member states, supported by the European Parlia-
ment, to introduce an energy chapter into the EC Treaty 
(TEC) have consistently failed due to the general resistance 
of member states to granting further energy competencies 
to the EU. Although the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new 
article (Article 3u), which added “measures in the fi eld of en-
ergy as legitimate Community activities”, this by no means 
constituted an EU competence or authority in the fi eld of 
energy. A number of member states were reluctant to lose 
their real or perceived autonomy over energy policy due to 
the differing interests of producer and non-producer coun-
tries as well as the different structures of national energy 
sectors, best exemplifi ed in the organisation of network en-
ergy industries.1 For the same reason, the creation of a sin-
gle energy market was originally neither part of the European 
Commission’s 1995 White Paper on the internal market nor 
of the Single European Act (SEA), the treaty revision of 1986 
that led to the implementation of the internal market. How-
ever, this “anomaly” was already revised in 1988 by including 
energy in the internal market programme.2
This is not to say, however, that EU energy policy did not ex-
ist altogether. In the absence of explicit competencies, the 
European Commission has – implicitly – been able to infl u-
1 Jacques P e l k m a n s : Making EU Network Markets Competitive, in: 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2007, pp. 432-456.
2 Stephen M a r t i n , Ali E l - A g r a a : Energy policy and energy markets, 
in: Ali M. E l - A g r a a  (ed.): The European Union, chapter 17, pp. 314-
329, 8th edition, Cambridge 2007, Cambridge University Press. 
Over recent years, the European Union has progressed at in-
creasing speed towards a common energy policy. After fi ve 
decades in which EU energy policy has been confi ned to the 
narrow fi elds of coal and nuclear energy, deriving its author-
ity from the treaties on the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) and on the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom), the Lisbon Treaty has fi nally established 
an EU energy policy competence. Article 194 creates a legal 
basis for European energy policy. Energy was one of the few 
areas in which the EU obtained new competencies, as op-
posed to a clarifi cation and consolidation. This constitutes 
a remarkable turnaround compared to a situation in which 
member states have jealously been guarding their authority 
over energy. Immediately before and after entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, previously unthinkable progress towards a 
genuine EU energy policy, i.e. EU-level policy formulation has 
been made. The events in Fukushima threaten to derail this.
The Need for an EU Energy Policy
For many years, outside the remit of the ECSC and Euratom, 
EU policy has been limited to a series of broad horizontal 
(intergovernmental) policy goals such as promoting the ra-
tional use of energy and reducing Europe’s oil-import de-
pendency. Periodic attempts to extend the EU’s jurisdic-
tion in times of real or perceived threats to energy supplies 
remained unsuccessful. EU policies seldom went beyond a 
broad consensus on general objectives (e.g. in the case of 
energy on competitiveness, environment and external rela-
tions) and suffered from a lack of effective implementation.
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On top of this, the EU and the world at large face the long-
term climate change challenge. Since some 80% of all 
greenhouse gas emissions are energy related, the EU aims 
for a low-carbon and generally more sustainable energy sec-
tor. This set the stage for the integrated Climate and Energy 
Package, adopted by the European Council on 6 April 2009.6 
Principle elements of this package include a set of EU targets 
– generally referred to as “20 20 by 2020” – and accompany-
ing policies. More specifi cally, the EU set itself legally binding 
targets to unilaterally reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020 by 20% compared to 1990 levels (up to 30% if other de-
veloped countries commit to comparable emissions reduc-
tions) and to increase the share of renewable energy in the 
EU’s total energy consumption to 20%. The EU also adopted 
an energy effi ciency goal aimed at reducing primary energy 
consumption by 20% by 2020 compared to projections. As 
this target – to date – is non-binding, there are questions as 
to whether it will be met. Moreover, the revised EU Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) has set an annual GHG reduction tar-
get of 1.74% starting in 2013.7
6 For a press statement on the Council’s adoption of the “climate-en-
ergy legislative package” as well as links to all of its elements, see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/
en/misc/107136.pdf.
7 A.D. E l l e r m a n , F. C o n v e r y, C. d e  P e r t h u i s : Pricing Carbon: The 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, Cambridge 2010, Cam-
bridge University Press.
ence energy policy by EU competency in such areas as the 
internal market (e.g. the opening of energy markets to com-
petition, technical harmonisation, tax approximation and 
public procurement), competition policy and, more recently, 
the environment, including climate change. This allowed the 
EU to shape the markets for different fuels and products, 
notably in electricity and gas, leading to a deepening of in-
tegration in the energy sector. The completion of the inter-
nal market for energy including electricity and gas is leading 
to the convergence of market structures, notably regarding 
primary fuels and generation technologies. Liberal markets 
favour solutions with the lowest capital investment and the 
shortest returns, e.g. gas and coal plants, over more capital-
intensive technologies such as nuclear. Convergence was 
reinforced through EU competition policy. Electricity and gas 
market liberalisation reduces governments’ levers to infl u-
ence investment decisions. Increasing cross-border trade 
requires cross-border regulation, thereby gradually provid-
ing for a bigger role of EU-level regulation.
In parallel, the EU saw a transition from a rather comforta-
ble energy supply situation with a healthy diversifi cation as 
regards both energy sources and geographical origin3 to a 
position where domestic reserves are dwindling at the same 
time that government intervention in the energy industry is on 
the rise in precisely those countries that could potentially fi ll 
the gap.4 Enlargement added new member states to the EU 
that did not enjoy the same degree of diversifi cation and in 
many instances were highly dependent on Russian imports, 
especially natural gas.5 In such a scenario, the EU and its 
member states have been examining in particular domestic 
policy options to move towards a more secure and sustain-
able supply of energy. Member states also started to realise 
that a more aligned external energy policy can add value to 
cope with this increasingly “hostile” environment.
3 Domestic and Norwegian resources enabled the EU to limit import 
dependence. Oil was abundantly available and oil markets were ef-
fi cient and liquid. Also, some 60-80 per cent of the world’s natural gas 
reserves are at an economically transportable distance from Europe, 
which also enjoys a near monopsony with Russia, home to the world’s 
largest gas resources. Other supplies such as those from Northern 
Africa were also considered secure as these countries depend in 
many cases exclusively on oil and gas for foreign exchange revenues. 
Furthermore, massive investments in nuclear energy in the 1970s and 
1980s allowed nuclear power to play an important role in the energy 
mix, with a positive effect on overall import dependence (albeit asso-
ciated with other security of supply risks). 
4 While many supplier countries seem unable to increase production 
due to a lack of investments, the fact that supplies are tightly control-
led by governments in exporting countries raises the fear of “exces-
sive” leverage by supplier countries such as Russia. Some supplier 
countries are hostile towards the West. Others are politically unsta-
ble. Many reserves will take years to develop due to problems of ac-
cess, investments and physical conditions. A prolonged tight market 
has increased political tensions and risks “resource nationalism”.
5 Pierre N o ë l : Beyond Dependence: How to deal with Russian gas, 
ECFR Policy Brief No. 9, London, November 2008, pp. 1-17, European 
Council on Foreign Relations.
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Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), which foresaw the spend-
ing of some €4 billion on interconnectors (e.g. electricity and 
gas), off-shore wind projects and carbon capture and stor-
age. The EERP was thus aimed at strengthening grids and 
addressing security of supply concerns that became espe-
cially apparent during the latest Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in 
2009.11 The EU has been able for the fi rst time to spend a sig-
nifi cant amount on energy infrastructures beyond the Trans-
European Network, and this is seen as a possible precursor 
for more to come. At the same time, it can be seen as a fi rst 
step in making solidarity operational beyond the “mantra” 
of market-based solidarity, i.e. the free fl ow of energy in a 
liberalised, integrated and interconnected European energy 
market.
Another step forward has been the Security of Gas Sup-
ply Regulation12, which requires member states to draw up 
strategies to assess gas supply risks and measures to ad-
dress them. Only residual risks should then be dealt with by 
the EU. This can be seen as a step towards addressing the 
risk of “moral hazard”13, which is a prerequisite for active EU 
solidarity. In fact, the Gas Regulation could serve as a model 
for assessments of other potential security of supply risks 
including, for example, oil supplies including refi ning, invest-
ment adequacy for different fuels, risks stemming from pos-
sible accidents, environmental pressures and energy price 
volatility.
Nevertheless, some continue to argue for a more central-
ised EU energy policy, moving towards a European Energy 
Community built upon consensus.14 Since such a Commu-
nity cannot be achieved immediately, the proposal – in good 
EU tradition – builds upon the “Europeanisation” of a limited 
number of areas where a common approach could possibly 
be achieved. Such areas include i) strengthening coopera-
tion with respect to energy networks, ii) a common energy 
fund for fi nancing new technologies in renewable energies 
11 S. P i r a n i , J. S t e r n , K. Ya f i m a v a : The Russo-Ukrainian gas dis-
pute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment, Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies Working Paper, Oxford 2009. 
12 The adopted Regulation, apart from giving a stronger role to the EU in 
coordinating member states’ responses to supply disruptions and de-
claring emergencies, requires member states to draw up preventive 
action and emergency plans for the case of disruption. It also intro-
duces supply and infrastructure standards to ensure that normal sup-
plies can be maintained during the coldest winters and provides for 
the introduction of reverse fl ow technologies in all interconnections 
between member states. Explicitly, the Regulation includes measures 
to ensure that security of supply would not be used as a loophole to 
distort the internal market, and to ensure that companies can sell gas 
where it is needed.
13 “Moral hazard” occurs when a member state is (partly) insulated from 
risks because of EU guarantees and therefore takes bigger security of 
supply risks than it would if it had to bear the full effects of a supply 
disruption itself. 
14 Sami A n d o u r a , Leigh H a n c h e r, Marc v a n  d e r  Wo u d e :  Towards 
a European Energy Community: A Policy Proposal, Policy Proposal by 
Jacques Delors, 2010, Notre Europe. 
The fact that decisions related to the fuel mix remain sub-
ject to unanimity and therefore de facto under member state 
authority did not seem to matter much because markets 
converged, driven by market liberalisation, EU regulation 
and the application of competition policy. Most importantly, 
the Climate and Energy Package has further reduced mem-
ber states’ autonomy in deciding on their own energy mix. 
According to the National Renewable Energy Action Plans, 
which provide roadmaps on how each member state aims 
to reach its binding national renewables target set out in the 
Renewables Directive, renewable energy should constitute 
some 37% of Europe’s electricity mix by 2020.8 Furthermore, 
the EU ETS will make high-carbon fuels such as coal in-
creasingly uncompetitive.
All this contributed to a change of mind towards a more in-
tegrated EU energy policy that became apparent at the 2005 
informal European Summit at Hampton Court, at which Eu-
ropean heads of state and government called on the Com-
mission to develop a new European energy policy. The con-
clusions of Hampton Court were later laid out in the Green 
Paper of March 20069 and further developed in the First Stra-
tegic Energy Review.10
This previously unthinkable rapprochement towards a gen-
uine EU energy policy has been accelerated by entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. It elevates 
energy into an area of shared competence between the Un-
ion and the member states (Article 4 TFEU). At the same time 
Article 194 TFEU mandates overall EU energy policy to focus 
on the establishment and functioning of the internal market, 
on securing EU energy supplies, on energy effi ciency and 
renewables and on the interconnection of energy networks. 
The same article includes a reference to solidarity which is 
repeated in Article 122 TFEU, referring to solidarity between 
member states in the case of severe diffi culties in the sup-
ply of energy. Being a shared competence, energy policy 
has become subject to majority voting with an enhanced role 
of the European Parliament as it falls under the “ordinary” 
procedure. Member states can only regulate energy issues 
when the Union has not exercised its competence.
The stage has been set for the gradual yet steady develop-
ment of an EU energy policy, including an external energy 
policy. Further and unexpected impetus has been provided 
by the economic crisis. In response to the global economic 
crisis starting 2008/2009, the EU decided on a European 
8 European Commission: Renewable Energy: Progressing towards the 
2020 Target, COM(2011) 31, 31 January 2011.
9 European Commission: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Com-
petitive and Secure Energy, Green Paper, COM(2006) 105, 8 March 
2006.
10 European Commission: An energy policy for Europe, COM(2007) 1, 10 
January 2007.
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lations and programmes in a rather uncoordinated fashion 
before the voluntary EU “stress tests” were announced after 
an emergency meeting of the European Council on 21 March 
2011.18
Such abrupt policy changes impact neighbouring countries 
and markets, risking short-term disruptions that markets will 
only address in the medium term. Phasing out nuclear plants 
in Germany or elsewhere will trigger investment in alternative 
generation, be it in renewables, thermal (gas or coal) or even 
new nuclear in those member states where nuclear energy 
is politically acceptable. As regards the latter it should be 
noted, however, that economics speaks against large-scale 
additions to nuclear capacity in Europe. New projects have 
been characterised by exploding investment costs coupled 
with largely unpredictable future revenues in increasingly 
liberalised electricity markets. Unless carbon prices under 
the EU ETS increase signifi cantly – something not expected 
until 2020 – the profi tability of new nuclear power plants will 
not decisively increase compared to more carbon intensive 
energy sources. Increasing public opposition in the wake of 
Fukushima would certainly increase the political risk related 
to nuclear and thereby also have a negative effect on the 
economics.
Potentially far more divisive and disruptive is the issue of 
nuclear safety. Irrespective of current safety rules, there 
will be additional safety measures and they will reduce the 
risk of serious accidents (albeit at increasing costs). How-
ever, as with other technologies, this risk can never be re-
duced to zero. Fukushima has shown that accidents can 
go beyond the worst-case scenarios imagined by power 
companies and governments, and thus beyond the safety 
measures of nuclear power plants. And although there is a 
very low probability, such accidents can have devastating 
consequences. If member states decide to live with this re-
sidual risk, then they must address the potential cross-bor-
der implications of radiation. In fact, since any large-scale 
nuclear accident in Europe would have European-wide 
consequences, there needs to be a consistent and binding 
approach to the highest nuclear safety standards across all 
EU member states on the European level. This is an EU is-
sue in line with the subsidiarity principle as laid out in Article 
5(3) TEU.
The recent saga about EU stress tests is a case study of how 
not to do it. A few days after the accident in Fukushima, EU 
Energy Commissioner Oettinger proposed that all nuclear 
power plants be submitted to a review on the basis of com-
prehensive and transparent risk and safety assessments (i.e. 
18 Council of the European Union: Press Release, Extraordinary Council 
meeting, Transport, Telecommunications and Energy, Energy Items, 
PRESSE 72, PR CO 19, 21 March 2011.
and networks and iii) the establishment of a Gas Purchasing 
Group. It is envisaged that only a number of member states 
would initially participate with others being able to join lat-
er. This nucleus of tasks and member states would gradu-
ally develop over time into a fully-fl edged Energy Commu-
nity encompassing all member states and all relevant tasks 
(of a cross-border nature) once the necessary consensus is 
found.
Will Fukushima Derail EU Energy Policy?
As long as a general consensus on the direction prevailed, 
progress towards an EU energy policy has been impres-
sive and seemed unstoppable. Numerous new initiatives 
have been launched by the European Commission including 
proposals for an energy strategy for the period until 2020, 
infrastructure development and energy effi ciency, to name 
but a few.15 The European Council, on 4 February 2011, fi -
nally made a fi rst step to align member states’ and EU en-
ergy policies when it “invited” member states to “inform” the 
European Commission of “all their new and existing bilateral 
energy agreements with third countries”.16 While this is not 
yet a compatibility test of member states’ agreements with 
EU objectives, it is a fi rst step in this direction.
As soon as the tragic events of Fukushima unfolded, the 
apparent consensus disappeared and the shortcomings of 
the current EU energy policy framework became evident. 
National preferences quickly trumped EU considerations. 
Driven by rapidly growing public opposition to nuclear pow-
er, which threatened to jeopardise the survival of a regional 
government, the German government quickly announced a 
three-month moratorium on the extension of the life span of 
its nuclear reactors decided barely six months earlier. The 
government also decided to test the safety of all its nuclear 
power plants and to – temporarily – shut down (or not restart) 
eight of Germany’s oldest plants that were considered po-
tentially unsafe and that produce a net output of 8.4 giga-
watts. This was done without informing, let alone consulting 
with, its neighbours. In fact, the Executive Director of the IEA 
recently recommended that Germany seek a European solu-
tion to its nuclear energy policy to avoid putting the security 
and sustainability of European energy supplies in danger.17 
However, Germany was not alone in its unsynchronised 
decision to revise its nuclear policy; many other EU mem-
ber states similarly decided on audits of their nuclear instal-
15 European Commission: Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, 
sustainable and secure energy, COM(2010) 639 of 10 November 2010; 
European Commission: Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and 
beyond, COM(2010) 677 of 17 November 2010; European Commis-
sion: Energy Effi ciency Plan 2011, COM(2011) 109 of 8 March 2011.
16 European Council, 4 February 2011, Conclusions, EUCO 2/1/11 REV 
1, CO EUR 2 CONCL 1, 8 March 2011.
17 Financial Times Deutschland: Energieagentur fürchtet Atomausstieg, 
23 May 2011.
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“stress tests”). This would have been a genuine European 
response. However, since EU competences are very limited 
as regards nuclear safety issues, member states could only 
agree on the least common denominator in the form of vol-
untary tests based on criteria that are lower than those ap-
plied by many national regulators, possibly even excluding 
man-made events such as severe human error, sabotage or 
malevolent attack. Under the Euratom Treaty, sanctions are 
only possible with regard to the safety of nuclear fuel (i.e. to 
prevent proliferation) and not to safety standards of nuclear 
power plants. Similarly, there is no deadline for adopting the 
stress tests and there is no guarantee that negative results 
will have any consequences since decisions on individual in-
stallations remain a national responsibility.
In the longer term, however, Fukushima may result in a 
chance to increase EU competence and raise standards as 
regards nuclear safety. This could start with a revision of the 
Euratom Treaty with a stronger focus on binding Europe-
wide safety standards, but also on eliminating legal incon-
sistencies with the new legislative structure of the EU. This 
could, for example, lead to the European Parliament being 
given co-decision powers on related matters. In addition, 
there may now be mounting pressure to raise safety stand-
ards as laid out in the Nuclear Safety Directive, and at least to 
make the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles binding at the 
European level (and in neighbouring countries). In the longer 
term, the establishment of a European regulatory body re-
sponsible for setting, implementing and enforcing EU-wide 
safety standards may even be considered.
If European energy policy is to have a meaning in the future, 
then it will need to address the risk of the cross-border ex-
ternality of radioactive fallout from a nuclear reactor, includ-
ing procedures for measures to be taken in the case of an 
accident and for compensation across borders. Otherwise, 
clauses on solidarity will sound empty and hinder EU energy 
policy development. This is the minimum that the EU must 
achieve if there is no consensus on nuclear energy in the EU. 
Whether this will “save” nuclear energy, i.e. lead to new in-
vestments, is another matter. This will be discussed in other 
contributions to this Forum. 
Richard S.J. Tol
The Impact of EU Enviromental Policy on the Energy Sector
EU energy policy is by consensus, that is, virtually non-exist-
ent. As of 2014, unanimity will be replaced by qualifi ed major-
ity voting, and we may expect to see the emergence of an EU 
energy policy. However, in the name of environmental policy, 
the EU has exerted considerable infl uence over the energy 
sector. In this paper, some of the issues will be reviewed.
EU environmental policy has always been by qualifi ed major-
ity, at least offi cially. In practice, EU environmental policy is 
driven by the political agenda of a small group of countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom). Other member states have accepted 
this in return for regional and agricultural subsidies. Environ-
mental policy increasingly intrudes into other policy areas. 
As energy is a large source of a variety of emissions into the 
atmosphere, environmental policy shapes energy policy.
Acidifi cation
This has been going on for a long time, but it has not always 
been obvious. Acid rain has long disappeared from the me-
dia and political agenda. The Large Combustion Plants Di-
rective regulates sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust 
emissions from power plants. This is primarily to reduce 
acidifi cation. The Directive puts a cap on the total amount 
emitted per plant. There are two ways to achieve this. First, 
there is end-of-pipe technology that “scrubs” the pollutants 
from the fl ue gas. Second, the plant can be closed. As ret-
rofi tting a power plant with scrubbers is expensive and as 
scrubbing uses energy, the second option may be the best. 
This is particularly the case for older coal plants, which al-
ready have diffi culty competing with newer plants and would 
have only a short period to earn back the investment in fl ue 
gas desulfurisation.
The Large Combustion Plants Directive thus effectively clos-
es older coal plants. That may be a sensible thing to do for 
environmental reasons, but it has ramifi cations for energy 
policy. The impact is perhaps strongest in the UK. The idio-
syncrasies of privatisation and deregulation in power gener-
ation mean that capital investment has not been suffi ciently 
incentivised. Power companies have been sweating their as-
sets, and have not invested enough in new power plants. The 
peculiarities of planning regulation mean that it is diffi cult to 
build new power plants in England and Wales, even if one 
wanted to. The UK is thus heading for a power shortage, with 
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rolling brown-outs a real possibility by the end of the dec-
ade. This can still be avoided through a crash programme 
of investments in gas-fi red power plants. Although domestic 
energy policy has played a major role in this, EU environmen-
tal policy is a key ingredient. Keeping the coal-fi red power 
plants open for a few more years would allow the UK to care-
fully consider and plan the upcoming major investment in 
new power generators.
The Climate and Energy Package
The impact of the EU climate and energy package will be 
more substantial than the regulation of air pollutants. The cli-
mate and energy package has a number of targets. In 2020, 
greenhouse gas emissions should be 20% below what they 
were in 1990. Renewables are to provide 20% of total fi nal 
energy use (and 10% of transport fuel use). And primary 
energy consumption is to be 20% below what it otherwise 
would have been in 2020, due to increased energy effi ciency. 
Whereas the last target is aspirational (at least for now), the 
fi rst two targets are legally binding.
Electricity
EU climate policy has far-reaching implications for power 
generation and the regulation of electricity markets.
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) for carbon diox-
ide permits puts a price on emissions from power genera-
tion and selected energy-intensive industries. This promotes 
energy effi ciency improvements, favours renewable and 
nuclear power over fossil fuels, and furthers natural gas at 
the expense of coal. It has created new activities in energy 
fi nance and consulting. Because initially emission permits 
were grandparented, there was an implicit transfer of wealth 
from society to companies. Permit holdings are now a sub-
stantial part of the balance sheet of power companies and 
have been used to fi nance expansion and diversifi cation. 
Over the course of the decade, an increasing share of emis-
sion permits will be auctioned rather than grandparented. 
Wealth will be transferred from companies to the European 
Commission1, putting pressure on the balance sheet of com-
panies at a time when new investment is needed.
Previously, power generation had two main aims: reliable 
and affordable electricity. Now it has three: reliable, afford-
able and clean electricity. Reliability and affordability are at 
odds with one another. Reliability is best achieved by expen-
sive redundancy. Clean electricity confl icts with both other 
aims. Carbon dioxide emission reduction raises the price 
of electricity. The market for coal is less prone to disruption 
1 The fi rst structural and substantial revenue stream directly to the Eu-
ropean Union.
than the market for gas, while solar and wind power are in-
termittent and volatile. As clean electricity has the force of 
EU legislation behind it, member states are forced to pursue 
it without suffi cient regard for the reliability and affordability 
of electricity.
The rapid expansion of renewable energy is another major 
change in the energy sector brought about by EU environ-
mental policy. Because renewable technologies for electric-
ity are more mature than renewables for heating or transport, 
power generation will be the main area for the expansion of 
renewables. Wind and solar power will account for the lion’s 
share of new renewable electricity. Wind and solar power are 
non-dispatchable, that is, the operator has little control over 
the power supplied to the network. This means that a range 
of auxiliary services needs to be provided to guarantee ca-
pacity, regulate frequency and improve fl exibility. Capacity is 
well-regulated already; the existing arrangements only need 
to be scaled up. Frequency and fl exibility, on the other hand, 
used to be of little concern to regulators. The provision of 
suffi cient capacity to meet peak demand is a public good in 
the power system. Likewise, the provision of fl exible capac-
ity to offset rapid changes in renewable supply is a public 
good. These public goods can be provided by a levy on all 
power generators, with the revenue going to the purchase 
of (fl exible) capacity. Deviant frequency is an externality that 
could be taxed. Alternatively, frequency controllers could be 
treated as a public good. In any case, electricity regulators 
will need to introduce new regulation.
Increased interconnection is one way to accommodate wind 
and solar power as the law of large numbers alleviates their 
volatility. Interconnection also helps to solve another prob-
lem, namely that the best supplies of wind (at the Atlantic 
seaboard and at sea) and solar energy (in Southern Europe 
and North Africa) are far from the main centres of electric-
ity demand. There is an infrastructure component to inter-
connection but also a regulatory one. There is no physical 
difference between transmission and interconnection, but 
whereas transmission starts and ends in the same jurisdic-
tion, interconnection starts in one and ends in another. There 
is no fundamental problem with trade between jurisdictions, 
but it does increase transaction costs and regulatory risks, 
particularly in a market as tightly regulated as electricity. In 
an attempt to stimulate interconnection and thus pave the 
way for renewables, the European Commission got involved 
in the harmonisation of power market regulation. Although 
this may be desirable in the long term, at the moment it is a 
case of the interconnection tail wagging the domestic power 
markets dog.
Moreover, the intervention of the European Commission has 
increased regulatory uncertainty. A new regulator has en-
tered the fi eld. The new regulator is without a track record 
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and without a network and therefore particularly unpredict-
able.
Regulatory certainty is key in power generation, and even 
more so in renewables. Power generation is heavily regu-
lated because there are common goods (security of supply, 
network stability), natural monopolies (transmission and dis-
tribution networks) and externalities (accidents, emissions). 
The capital stock is long-lived. The ability to earn a return 
on an investment therefore depends on the investor’s skill in 
predicting, or infl uencing, future regulations. Whereas fossil 
electricity competes on its own merit, the market share of 
renewables is solely by regulatory fi at. Moreover, the cost of 
capital is more important to renewables than to fossil fuels.
Therefore, by increasing regulatory uncertainty, the Euro-
pean Commission may well have reduced the incentive to 
invest in the electricity sector – exactly the opposite of what 
they sought to achieve.
Demand-side management is another option to manage the 
increased volatility of electricity supply. Traditionally, elec-
tricity systems have sought to meet demand, increasing and 
decreasing supply as needed. Demand-side management 
seeks to reduce electricity demand or shift it to times that 
better suit supply. There are three elements to this. First, 
consumers can relinquish part of the control over their en-
ergy demand to the energy supplier. This is not uncommon 
for refridgerated warehouses, but interruptable supply con-
tracts have a limited appeal only. Second, consumers can be 
provided with the necessary information to better manage 
their electricity use. Third, the provider can use price signals 
to change customers’ behaviour.
Demand-side management requires smart meters, devices 
that collect information and communicate in real time. Smart 
meters have been around for a long time, and are now ready 
for mass deployment to every household. This has major 
implications. The purpose of smart meters is to enable de-
mand-side management, which helps with the integration of 
volatile renewables. However, smart meters will also teach 
utilities about their customers. At the moment, utilities know 
remarkably little about households: monthly electricity use, 
address and payment history. With smart meters, utilities will 
know that you are in the habit of turning on the bathroom light 
at 3 a.m. In other industries, the ability to profi le clients has 
always been followed by market segmentation and attempts 
at exclusion. It may well be that certain types of household 
are more profi table than others. New regulation may need to 
be introduced to prevent exclusion from the electricity retail 
market.
Smart meters also allow smart appliances, which use the in-
formation from the smart meter to optimise their operation. 
Fridges, for instance, may be slightly warmer when electricity 
is expensive, and the battery of an all-electric vehicle may 
postpone recharging. It may even discharge to the net if the 
price is high enough, because smart meters also allow mi-
crogeneration2 and microstorage.3
Smart meters thus turn hitherto passive consumers into ac-
tive market participants. If properly incentivised, active con-
sumers should dampen price volatility by reducing demand 
when supply is scarce. Chances are, it will take some experi-
mentation before proper incentives are in place.
These are uncertain times for power companies. Power 
generation is capital-intensive, so uncertainty matters a lot. 
What is more, wind and solar power are even more capital-
intensive than coal- and gas-fi red power. If we add the fact 
that European banks will need to be (re)capitalised and that 
governments will need to rebuild their balance sheets, then 
the prospects of meeting the targets in the energy and cli-
mate package do not look good.
Transport
The transport sector is a major user of energy, particularly 
liquid fuels. Transport policy is by and large the domain of 
national policy, although the European Union has been a 
major sponsor of transport infrastructure in accession coun-
tries and disadvantaged areas. Air pollution regulation has 
a large multilateral component through the UN Economic 
Commission for Europe. The climate and energy package 
will increase EU involvement in transport policy. As noted 
above, 10% of transport fuels are supposed to be renewable 
by 2020.
Furthermore, carbon-effi ciency standards (falling from 130 g 
CO2/km today to 95 g CO2/km in 2020) have been imposed 
on the average fl eet of car manufacturers.4 As the regulation 
is for the fl eet, averaged by sales, the impact on emissions 
is more diffi cult to predict. Car use, rather than ownership, 
determines emissions; and people who drive a lot tend to 
own (or lease) heavier and larger cars. Moreover, the sanc-
tion for violations is a fi ne that is modest relative to the price 
of a premium car. Manufacturers may choose to pay the 
fi ne and pass it on to status-conscious consumers. Over-
all, the standard is likely to reduce fuel use in transport, and 
2 Microgeneration is electricity generation in the house (e.g. solar pan-
els), with excess power delivered to the net.
3 Microstorage is power storage in the house, taking power from the 
net when the price is low and discharging to the net when the price is 
high. Microstorage is non-existent at present, but this may change if 
there is a large supply of second-hand batteries from all-electric and 
hybrid vehicles.
4 Manufacturers are distinguished by operations rather than owner-
ship.
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particularly that of carbon-ineffi cient petrol. This will mean 
a reduction in the growth of fuel demand and a shift in its 
composition, but the impact on the energy sector will not be 
profound.
This may not be the case for the renewables target. As all-
electric vehicles only serve a small niche market, and as 
fuel cell and hydrogen vehicles are not yet ready for mass 
deployment, the renewables target will probably be met by 
blending bioethanol with petrol and biodiesel with diesel. 
This is technically straightforward. The main question is 
whether enough biofuels can be sourced, and at what price. 
The USA is ahead of Europe in this regard and the diversion 
of maize from food and feed to fuel has caused a sharp rise 
in food prices around the world. This could happen again if 
the EU followed through on its plans.5
The medium-term impact on the transport energy sector is 
a further distortion of the market by government policy, and 
a sizeable investment in a biofuel transport and processing 
infrastructure that would become obsolete as soon as the 
regulation changes, since biofuels cannot compete on the 
open market.
The long-term impact may be more profound. First-genera-
tion bioenergy6 is rather clumsy. It is expensive, it competes 
with food, and the net energy yield is low (or even negative). 
Therefore, a considerable effort is being made to develop 
second-generation bioenergy7 and to research third-gener-
ation bioenergy.8 Whereas progress in second-generation 
bioenergy has been slow, third-generation bioenergy is 
causing lots of excitement in laboratories around the world.
If it is possible to upscale and commercialise some of the 
new discoveries, then there may be a revolution in energy 
supply. Exploration, exploitation, transport and processing 
of fuels would be transformed, and powerful players in those 
markets would be wiped out. Although some people speak 
excitedly of a “Google of energy” or a “Facebook of fuel”, 
transport fuels would still be produced in large volumes, so 
that major investments would be needed in production and 
5 This is not certain. Biofuels are controversial. Imported biofuels from 
Brazil and Southeast Asia could well run into opposition from farmers 
(who tend to oppose international trade) and environmentalists (who 
would be concerned about deforestation), while EU-grown biofuels 
would be very expensive and save little energy.
6 First-generation bioenergy uses existing plants and variants of an-
cient technologies. Examples are the burning of wood, the pressing of 
seeds for oil, and the making of charcoal.
7 Second-generation bioenergy uses existing plants and new technolo-
gies. Examples include gasifi cation and cellulosic conversion of bio-
mass.
8 Third-generation bioenergy uses new plants. That may involve breed-
ing and genetic modifi cation, but also plants (e.g. algae) that have 
hitherto been ignored.
transport. The revolution, if there were one, would unfold 
over decades.
Households and Small Businesses
Space heating is another major source of energy demand. 
The climate and energy package does not specifi cally target 
this. However, there is a cap on greenhouse gas emissions in 
2020 which cannot be met without affecting space heating. 
Conventional wisdom has it that a lot of energy is wasted. 
Energy effi ciency improvements can thus reduce emissions 
with relatively little effort and at a relatively minor cost. A 
number of countries have sizeable programmes for energy 
effi ciency, but there has been little evaluation of their costs 
and effi cacy.
Renewable energy for both heating and electricity (see 
above) is also stimulated in a number of member states 
through a variety of taxes and subsidies – and even, in at 
least one case (Ireland), through both a tax and a subsidy. 
The European Commission has left it to the member states 
to meet the non-ETS part of their target. There is the pos-
sibility of bilateral trade in non-ETS emission allowances 
between member states, but the implementation of green-
house gas emission reduction policy is a strictly domestic 
matter. As these targets mainly concern households and 
small businesses, domestic implementation is in line with the 
subsidiarity principle.
However, different member states go about reducing non-
ETS emissions in very different ways. This implies new op-
portunities for direct importation, a distortion of cross-bor-
der service trade, and maybe even international migration in 
border regions. These effects could be large locally but are 
probably small nationally. There are no structural implica-
tions for the energy sector.
Conclusions
This article has reviewed the implications of EU environmen-
tal policy, and particularly climate policy, for the energy sec-
tor in Europe. Power generation is affected most, followed 
by transport and residential energy use. In electricity, the im-
plications of climate policy go far beyond energy effi ciency 
improvements and supply switching. More and new regula-
tion is required to cope with the increased volatility of sup-
ply and demand, and the EU is stepping in as a regulator. At 
the same time, major new capital investments will need to be 
made. This underlines the ambition of EU climate policy. It 
also calls for an effective EU energy policy to counterbalance 
the current focus on clean energy; reliable and affordable en-
ergy are great goods too.
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Michel Berthélemy and François Lévêque
Harmonising Nuclear Safety Regulation in the EU: Which Priority?
Nuclear power presents the risk of severe accidents which 
can potentially lead to very high costs to society and the 
environment. In that respect, the Fukushima accident has 
reminded us that a nuclear catastrophe can even occur in 
a country with an advanced nuclear industry and has led to 
renewed scrutiny of nuclear safety regulation in Europe. The 
European Union, with its 143 nuclear power plants (NPPs), is 
one of the most nuclearised regions in the world, with about 
one-third of the world’s nuclear capacity. In addition, Euro-
pean NPPs are spread over a large number of countries in a 
relatively small geographical area. As a consequence, trans-
border damage from severe nuclear accidents is potentially a 
major issue for the EU.
The 1957 Euratom Treaty and European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) case law1 recognise the EU competency for liability 
rules and nuclear safety standards, respectively. Despite this 
legal basis for EU intervention in these two policy areas and 
the fact that the Euratom Treaty is often described as one of 
the “three pillars” of the EU, the current framework can be 
pictured as a patchwork of national laws with limited efforts 
to harmonise nuclear safety standards and no legislative ac-
tion in the fi eld of nuclear liability rules.
In this paper, we propose to summarise the current legal and 
institutional frameworks regulating nuclear safety standards 
and liability rules in the EU and explore their economic con-
sequences.
The Economics of Nuclear Safety in a Nutshell
Nuclear safety is characterised both by ex ante (i.e. stand-
ards) and ex post (i.e. liability) regulation. Nuclear safety 
standards are based on the concept of “defence in depth”, 
which encompasses the actions and systems in place to 
prevent the risks of a nuclear core failure and the release of 
nuclear materials in the atmosphere and water. While some 
risk classes – such as terrorist attacks – are diffi cult to be 
conceived of in a probabilistic framework and follow a de-
terministic approach, nuclear safety standards result from 
probabilistic risk assessments of nuclear core damage. 
They are set regardless of the expected cost of a nuclear 
accident. By contrast, liability rules apply ex post. They gov-
ern the allocation of fi nancial responsibilities in the case of a 
1 European Court of Justice: Judgment of the Court of 10 December 
2002 – Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union, Case C-29/99, European Court Reports, 2002.
nuclear accident and the compensation to victims. They can 
also require the operator to have liability insurance available 
up to a specifi c amount. In that case, liability insurance will 
vary depending on the expected damage that an NPP can 
cause.
From an economic point of view, the socially optimal level of 
care occurs when the marginal cost of care (i.e. the safety ef-
forts and investments made by the operator) equals the mar-
ginal benefi t (i.e. the marginal reduction in the expected cost 
of a nuclear accident). The economic literature2 recognises 
that the combination of these two instruments can be neces-
sary to achieve an effi cient level of safety. On the one hand, 
when the cost of a nuclear accident differs among NPPs, the 
safety standard is ineffi cient because it does not take into 
account the heterogeneity in nuclear damage; unlimited li-
ability is then superior to internalise the expected cost of a 
nuclear accident. On the other hand, unlimited liability is in-
effective when the expected cost of damages exceeds the 
operator assets and standards are therefore necessary to 
enforce the effi cient level of care. In practice, priority is given 
to ex ante regulation as the cost of a severe nuclear accident 
will both far exceed the assets of any nuclear operator and is 
diffi cult to estimate by insurers.3
The right balance between national and supranational nu-
clear standards must also be found. As seen in Chernobyl 
and Fukushima, most nuclear damage occurs at the local 
level and impacts the local population, i.e. the inhabitants 
in a 20-50 km radius. The local population also gets a share 
of the benefi ts through employment and taxes. It is there-
fore economically recommended that nuclear safety regula-
tion take into account the way local inhabitants balance the 
expected costs and benefi ts of a nuclear power plant and 
its safety improvements. Within the EU, these preferences 
are very heterogeneous. The variation of local risk aversion 
across the EU is illustrated by opinion polls. According to 
Eurobarometer, on average 37% of the EU public are in fa-
2 S. S h a v e l : A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regula-
tion, in: RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1992, pp. 271-
280; M. Tre b i l o c k , R. W i n t e r : The economics of nuclear accident 
law, in: International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 17, 1997, 
pp. 215-243.
3 This is because of the complex nature of nuclear radiation’s impacts 
on the environment and human health and because of the (fortunate-
ly) too limited historical number of severe accidents on which actu-
arial calculus can be based.
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vour of nuclear energy, but support runs as high as 68% in 
Hungary and as low as 8% in Austria.4
However, signifi cant damage can also affect distant zones 
owing to the dispersion of radioactive elements by aerial 
and water currents. Similarly, some of the benefi ts of nuclear 
power generation are enjoyed at a large distance from the 
power plant. To cope with these long-distance external ef-
fects5, the preferences of people living outside the local 
zones of NPPs also have to be taken into account by nuclear 
safety regulation.
To simplify the discussion for the EU, the local vs. global di-
chotomy for the external effects could be assimilated to a na-
tional vs. European distinction. The majority of EU member 
states are small countries, and many NPPs are located close 
to national borders. For instance, trans-border damages are 
potentially an important issue for the EU as about 25% of the 
143 NPPs are located within a 30 km radius of another mem-
ber state (and 40% are within a 100 km radius).
To sum up, from an economic perspective there is no rea-
son to impose a “one size fi ts all” level of nuclear safety. Be-
cause of local preferences, especially regarding risks, it is 
economically rational for identical power plants in two differ-
ent areas to be regulated differently (e.g. shutting one down 
completely and extending the life of the other conditioned on 
safety improvements). To put it another way, it is not irrational 
that in Europe a less safe NPP could have its life extended 
whereas a safer one is shut down. Conversely, due to poten-
tial trans-border damage, it must be possible to shut down 
an NPP even if the local population would rather not close it. 
Neither the national nor the supranational level can unilater-
ally impose its safety decision upon the other. A mix between 
national and international standards is required, even within 
the EU.
What is the right mix between ex ante and ex post regulation 
and between state and EU-level regulation? Our aim is not to 
provide a defi nite normative answer to these diffi cult ques-
tions. We only seek to provide some factual and analytical 
elements to facilitate the discussion.
4 House of Lords European Committee: 37th Report, 2006, http://
www.publications.parliament.uk /pa/ld200506/ldselect / ldeu-
com/211/21105.htm#a12. Moreover, a more recent Eurobarometer 
poll (March 2011) indicates that on average 41% of EU27 citizens 
agree with the proposition that “the benefi ts of nuclear as an energy 
source outweigh its risks”. This fi gure is 59% in the Czech Republic 
and 11% in Cyprus. See: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/
doc/2010_eurobarometer_safety.pdf. 
5 Note that the image and the future of the nuclear power generation 
industry as a whole are affected by any single catastrophe. Safety 
standards set by collective organisations such as Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations in the USA or the World Association of Nuclear Op-
erators attempt to mitigate this negative long-distance external eco-
nomic effect of severe nuclear accidents. 
Nuclear Safety Standards in the EU
Traditionally, member states have been divided on the issue 
of common nuclear safety standards, which have been left 
in the hands of national safety authorities. At the same time, 
the 2002 ECJ case law 29/99 recognises that the Commis-
sion shares competences with member states in the fi eld 
of nuclear safety, and with the perspective gained via the 
inclusion of nuclearised states from Eastern Europe in the 
EU enlargement, the European Commission has initiated 
a series of proposals to harmonise nuclear safety rules in 
Europe since the 2002 nuclear package. This complex and 
heavily debated process eventually led to the 2009/71/
Euratom directive (hereafter the 2009 directive) “establish-
ing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear 
installations”.
Beyond the political opposition surrounding the negotiation 
of this directive, the European Nuclear Safety Regulators 
Group6 (ENSREG) has analysed the pros and cons of estab-
lishing detailed and binding nuclear safety standards at the 
EU level. The ENSREG is an expert body set up to advise the 
Commission on nuclear safety issues and is composed of 
the heads of national safety authorities from the 27 EU mem-
ber states. As ENSREG argues, European common nuclear 
safety standards would strengthen the independence of na-
tional regulators, provide the possibility for the EU to take the 
international lead on nuclear safety, improve dialogue with 
the industry at the EU level and make communication about 
safety more transparent. Conversely, because of differences 
in safety cultures and approaches, agreeing on common 
rules would be costly in terms of time and resources, would 
create problems of transposition and interpretation into na-
tional laws, would monopolise the resources of national 
regulators and could lead to decisions based on the least 
common denominator with respect to safety standards for 
existing reactors.
More generally, the political divisions between the propo-
nents and opponents of nuclear power make it likely that the 
former may perceive EU intervention in the fi eld of nuclear 
safety as a threat of legal proceedings in front of the ECJ by 
member states opposed to nuclear power.
While the 2009 directive must still be transposed into na-
tional laws7, legal scholars argue that this one is substantially 
6 ENSREG: Discussion document on consequences of EU instruments 
in the fi eld of nuclear safety, fi nal report, 31 March 2009, http://circa.
europa.eu/Public/irc/tren/nuclear_safety_and_waste/library?l=/gen-
eral_archive/public/p2009-08_instrumentspdf_2/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
7 Member states have until June 2011 to transpose directive 2009/71/
Euratom into national laws.
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watered down compared to the initial proposals.8 The initial 
proposals created legally binding nuclear safety standards 
with monitoring mechanisms through the creation of an EU 
regulatory committee chaired by the Commission. The cur-
rent directive is essentially devoted to the requirement that 
member states have national frameworks for nuclear safety 
with independent safety authorities and that they report to 
the Commission through a peer-review process as well as 
transparency platforms. In that respect, the 2009 directive 
is partly based on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
(IAEA) “Fundamental Safety Principals” and makes these 
voluntary standards binding for EU member states. Moreo-
ver, the importance given to the independence of nuclear 
safety authorities can be considered a signifi cant provision 
of the directive9, as nuclear safety authorities face inherent 
risks of government pressure to ease or trigger nuclear safe-
ty standards. On the other hand, no clear defi nition of EU nu-
clear safety standards was made; this task falls to ENSREG 
in accordance with the mandate given to it by the Commis-
sion.10
In parallel to ENSREG and the EU framework, the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) acts 
as a discussion forum to develop a common approach to 
nuclear safety in Europe. WENRA is a network of 17 Euro-
pean nuclear regulators and was created in 1999 to assess 
nuclear safety standards in accession countries to the EU. 
The WENRA members are essentially the same as those of 
ENSREG. However, membership is not bound to the EU bor-
ders and only includes countries with nuclear reactors. While 
WENRA does not have a formal mandate within the EU, it has 
contributed to the improvement of nuclear safety in Europe in 
two different areas:
• Firstly, WENRA expertise was used to provide an inde-
pendent assessment of the national frameworks for nu-
clear safety in Eastern European accession countries. 
Based on its recommendations, the closure of eight NPPs 
in three countries was made a necessary condition for 
them to join the EU.11
• Secondly, following the Fukushima accident, WENRA ex-
pertise has also been requested by the Council to develop 
a common stress test of the safety margins and emergen-
8 A. S t a n i č : EU Law on Nuclear Safety, in: Journal of Energy and Natu-
ral Resources Law, Vol. 28, No.1, 2010, pp. 145-158; M. S o u s a  F e r-
ro : Directive 2009/71/Euratom: the losing battle against discrimina-
tion and protection of sovereignty, in: International Journal of Nuclear 
Law, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2009, pp. 295-312.
9 For instance, the French nuclear safety authority (ASN) only became 
fully independent from the government in 2007.
10 Decision 2007/530/Euratom on “establishing the European High Level 
Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management”.
11 Namely, NPPs in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia: Bohunice 1 and 2, 
Kozloduy 1 to 4 and Ignalina 1 and 2. 
cy preparedness of European NPPs in light of the events 
that led to the Fukushima accident.
These two WENRA contributions to a common approach for 
nuclear safety highlight the fact that national regulators can 
cooperate on a voluntary basis to promote nuclear safety 
standards in Europe beyond the provisions of the 2009 di-
rective. In that respect, this framework refl ects a balance be-
tween the national and supranational dimensions of nuclear 
safety as mentioned in the fi rst section. Moreover, it can be 
argued that WENRA may be more effi cient than ENSREG in 
making decisions to further enhance nuclear safety; at the 
time of writing this paper, the recent failure of ENSREG to 
agree on the WENRA proposal for EU stress tests shows that 
the political divisions between proponents and opponents of 
nuclear energy within the EU can hinder the efforts to agree 
on nuclear safety standards in Europe12 and that achieving 
more harmonisation of nuclear safety standards through the 
EU institutions – beyond the provisions of the 2009 directive 
– would be a diffi cult task.
Liability Rules in the EU
Unlike ex ante nuclear safety regulation, the European in-
stitutions have not intervened in the fi eld of nuclear liability 
rules13, which are regulated by international conventions and 
national laws. First and foremost, it should be noted that the 
Euratom Treaty clearly states that nuclear risks should be 
covered by insurance contracts by member states and that 
both the Council and the Commission should issue directives 
in this fi eld14 and take action if a member state fails to cover 
these risks.15 Despite this clear provision in the Euratom 
Treaty, the EU has never issued a directive or a regulation in 
this fi eld; even a directive it issued for liabilities from environ-
mental damage excluded nuclear damage from its scope.16
12 Euractiv: EU countries divided over nuclear stress tests, 13 May 2011. 
While the WENRA stress test proposal only included risks from en-
vironmental disasters, Commissioner Oettinger and member states 
such as Austria want to include terrorist attacks, plane crashes and 
human error risks. See: http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-coun-
tries-divided-nuclear-stress-tests-news-504812.
13 With the exception of two recommendations by the Commission dur-
ing the 1960s (65/42/Euratom and 66/22/Euratom) and communica-
tion COM(2006) 844 fi nal.
14 Euratom Treaty, Article 98: “Member States shall take all measures 
necessary to facilitate the conclusion of insurance contracts covering 
nuclear risks. The Council, acting by a qualifi ed majority on a proposal 
from the Commission, which shall […] issue directives for the applica-
tion of this Article.”
15 Euratom Treaty, Article 203: “If action by the Community should prove 
necessary to attain one of the objectives of the Community […], the 
Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate 
measures.
16 Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the pre-
vention and remedying of environmental damage. 
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International nuclear law can be characterised by its division 
between two regimes – the Vienna and the Paris Conven-
tions – which were themselves completed via distinct sup-
plementary conventions but which are also linked through a 
joint convention which allows mutual recognition of the two 
regimes. The Paris regime takes place within the OECD Nu-
clear Energy Agency (NEA) while the Vienna regime takes 
place within the IAEA. Both regimes have specifi c rules with 
respect to liability amounts, defi nitions of nuclear damage – 
such as environmental damage – and periods for claims. The 
latest conventions of the Paris and Vienna regimes can be 
best described as three-tier systems of strict but limited li-
abilities: the fi rst tier falls on the operator, the second tier on 
the installation state and the third tier comes from collective 
state funds. On top of these two international regimes, the 
1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for nu-
clear damage (CSC) allows extra compensation of up to €713 
million and more legal certainty. However, Romania is the 
only EU member state to have ratifi ed this convention. Tables 
1 and 2 present the general liability rules and the minimum 
liability amounts associated with them respectively.
As Table 1 shows, member states differ in terms of the in-
ternational nuclear law regimes they belong to and in terms 
of the conventions they have signed or ratifi ed. Generally 
speaking, we observe that the old member states are part 
of the NEA regime while new member states from Eastern 
Europe are, with the exception of Slovenia, part of the IAEA 
regime. The 1988 joint protocol between the two regimes al-
lows for mutual recognition, but some member states – Bel-
gium, France and the UK – have not ratifi ed this protocol. As 
Table 2 shows, both generations of the Paris regime foresee 
higher minimum liability amounts than the Vienna regime. 
However, only few states are part of the second genera-
tion of international liability regimes. For instance, no mem-
ber states have ratifi ed the 2004 Paris Convention – which 
amends the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels 
Supplementary Convention – and increases the total com-
pensation available from €356 million to €1500 million.
The differences in terms of liability rules arising from the two 
international regimes are also reinforced by specifi c nation-
al legislation which can be set above the minimum liability 
amounts of the international regimes. Figure 1 provides an 
Table 1
Overview of the International Regimes for Nuclear 
Liabilities
International Regimes Member States
Paris regime 
(NEA)
Paris (1960) and 
Brussels (1963)a
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, 
Italy, the UK, Spain, Slovenia
Ratifi ed Joint 
Protocol (1988)
Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, 
Germany, Swe-
den, Italy, the UK, 
Spain, Slovenia
Signed Joint 
Protocol (1988)
Belgium, France, 
the UK
Paris (1960)a only Portugal, Greece
Paris (2004)b none
Vienna 
regime 
(IAEA)
Vienna (1963)a
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Latvia, Romania
Joint Protocol 
(1988)
All
Vienna (1997)b
Signed Vienna 
(1997)
Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Hun-
gary, Poland
Ratifi ed Vienna 
(1997)
Latvia, 
Romania
Convention on Supplementary 
Compensation for Nuclear 
Damages (1997)
Signed Lithuania,
Czech Republic
Ratifi ed Romania
Nothing
Austria, Luxembourg, Ireland, Cyprus, 
Malta
a First generation; b Second generation.
S o u rc e : J. H a n d r l i c a : Euratom powers in the fi eld of nuclear liabil-
ity revisited, in: International Journal of Nuclear Law, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, 
pp. 1-18.
Table 2
Nuclear Liability Amounts Available Through the 
International Regimes
(€ million)
* (USD 1963 value).
S o u rc e : T.V. B o r re : Shifts in Governance in Compensation for Nucle-
ar Damage, 20 Years after Chernobyl, in: M. F a u re ,  A. Ve r h e i j  (eds.): 
Shifts in Compensation for Environmental Damage, Springer, Vienna 
2007, pp. 261-311.
Convention Who pays?
First 
generation
Second 
generation
Paris Convention Nuclear operator 5.9 700
Brussels 
Supplementary
Convention
Installation State 202.13 500
Collective State Fund 148.62 300
Total Paris regime 356.7 1,500
Vienna Convention
Nuclear operator 4.2* 178.35
Collective State Fund 178.35
Total Vienna 
Convention
4.2* 356.7
Convention of 
Supplementary
Compensation
Operator/Installation 
State
356.7
Collective State Fund 356.7
Total CSC 713.4
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overview of the operator maximum liability amounts as well 
as the total compensation available from the installation state 
or international arrangements in EU member states.17
As Figure 1 shows, nuclear operator fi nancial securities 
for nuclear liabilities and the total compensation available 
vary extensively among member states. Operator liabilities 
range from €5.4 million in Italy to €2500 million in Germany, 
and total compensation available ranges from €16.3 million 
in Greece and Portugal to €5130 million in Germany. Only 
Germany, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg have introduced 
the rule of unlimited liability in their national legislations. 
Moreover, operator liabilities amount on average to 59% of 
the total compensation available, with the remainder being 
shared between the installation state (17%) and international 
arrangements (24%).
In that respect, EU citizens would not be entitled to the same 
level of compensation depending on the installation state 
where the nuclear accident takes place. Moreover, this dis-
crimination is further strengthened by differences in terms of 
the legal defi nition given to nuclear damage and claim pe-
riods as well as in priority rules for victim compensation.18 
Such discrepancies create clear equality problems which 
are reinforced by the importance of the trans-border conse-
quences of nuclear accidents.
Are these limits to nuclear liabilities high enough to internal-
ise the risks of nuclear damage? Severe damage in the case 
of a core meltdown can amount to several dozens of billions 
of euros in liabilities. At the time of the writing of this paper, 
investment bank estimates of the damages resulting from the 
Fukushima accident range from $25 billion to $130 billion.19 
Similarly, while no complete study exists about the costs of 
the Chernobyl nuclear accident, estimates for the Belaru-
sian economy alone amount to €235 billion.20 These fi gures 
far exceed the national liability systems. The highest level of 
compensation available in Europe (i.e. in Germany) amounts 
to €5.1 billion. EU nuclear liability amounts are also low com-
pared to the estimated cost of nuclear accidents based on 
probabilistic risk assessments. For instance, estimates by 
17 OECD: Nuclear operator liability amounts & fi nancial security limits as 
of December 2009, http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/2009%20table%20
liability-coverage-limits.pdf.
18 OECD: Priority rules on compensation for nuclear damage in national 
legislation as of December 2009. For instance, in Spain personal in-
jury will receive priority over property damage, http://www.oecd-nea.
org/law/TABLE%20-%20Priority%20rules%2015%2012%2009.pdf.
19 POWERnews: No Limits for TEPCO’s Liability in Fukushima Crisis, 
Japan Says, 4 May 2011, http://www.powermag.com/print/POW-
ERnews/No-Limits-for-TEPCOs-Liability-in-Fukushima-Crisis-Ja-
pan-Says_3686.html.
20 IAEA: Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Eco-
nomic Impacts, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/
Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf.
the EU-fi nanced ExternE project21 of the expected external 
cost of a severe nuclear accident range from €431 million to 
€83 billion. Other estimates22 give a range of €10-€100 billion.
Hence, by several orders of magnitude, nuclear liability limits 
in the EU are below the cost of a severe nuclear accident. 
Economically speaking, this risk is far from fully internalised. 
Taxpayers will be the main contributors of funds to compen-
sate victims rather than the shareholders of power compa-
nies or electricity consumers. The risk is implicitly carried by 
the state.
In short, nuclear liability rules are set at low levels compared 
to the expected cost of severe nuclear damage. This leads to 
important equality problems, as a victim’s compensation will 
depend upon where the nuclear accident happens. Simulta-
neously, low liability levels might also breach EU economic 
principles, as they can be viewed as indirect subsidies. One 
proposal made by economists to solve these two problems 
21 C. S c h i e b e r,  T. S c h n e i d e r : Valorisation monétaire des impacts 
sanitaires et environnementaux d’un accident nucléaire : synthèse 
des études ExternE, intérêts et limites de développements complé-
mentaires, in: Rapport No. 275, CEPN, Paris, 2002, http://www.cepn.
asso.fr/IMG/pdf/R275.pdf.
22 M.G. F a u re ,  K. F i o re: An economic analysis of the nuclear liabil-
ity subsidy, in: Pace Environmental Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2009, 
pp. 419-427.
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is to create an EU pool of nuclear liability23, which would in-
crease the coverage of nuclear damage and, through the mu-
tualisation of risks, reduce the cost of liability insurance. This 
system has already been implemented at the state level in 
Germany and in the United States, where it allows higher lev-
els of compensation. Similarly, it has also been proposed to 
create an EU nuclear accident pool which reverses the chan-
nelling of responsibilities by making member states strictly 
liable24 via a risk-sharing mechanism based on expected 
damage and offers the possibility for the state to delegate 
some responsibility to the operator. In any case, solutions to 
remedy the problems raised by the current liability system in 
the EU are required and economists and legal scholars have 
to be imaginative.
23 M.G. F a u re , K. F i o re : The coverage of the nuclear risk in Europe: 
Which alternative?, in: The Geneva Papers in Risk and Insurance, 
Vol. 33, 2008, pp. 288-322.
24 G. S k o g h : A European nuclear accident pool, in: The Geneva Papers 
in Risk and Insurance, Vol. 33, 2008, pp. 274-287.
Conclusion
Through several initiatives, EU institutions have devoted im-
portant political efforts to the harmonisation of nuclear safe-
ty standards in Europe. Thanks to these efforts, the Com-
mission issued the 2009 directive and established ENSREG. 
These actions were made in parallel to the creation of the 
WENRA network which, through a voluntary association of 
nuclear regulators,  has made several proposals to harmo-
nise nuclear safety standards. Following the Fukushima ac-
cident, the political diffi culty in trying to fi nd agreement on 
EU stress tests show that political divisions among member 
states and with the Commission will make further EU bind-
ing harmonisation of safety standards diffi cult. Conversely, 
liability rules have received little attention despite the clear 
provisions set by the Euratom Treaty and the failure of mem-
ber states to set liability rules at a level commensurable to 
the expected costs of nuclear damage. In that respect, it is 
urgent for the Commission to reallocate part of its resources 
and efforts from the harmonisation of nuclear safety stand-
ards to the harmonisation of liability rules.
Jaap C. Jansen
In the Wake of Fukushima, Should our Electricity become Almost 
Completely Renewable and Completely Non-Nuclear?
Yet all over the world, not least in Europe, the Fukushima nu-
clear accident has given politicians and energy policy ana-
lysts food for thought in reassessing the role of nuclear en-
ergy and renewables in their long-term energy policies. The 
fi rst government to radically revise its energy policy regard-
ing the deployment of nuclear power reactors was the Ger-
man coalition government of Christian Democrats and Liber-
als, led by Angela Merkel. Mrs. Merkel had already made up 
her mind on 12 March 2011: she ordered the 7 oldest of Ger-
many’s 17 nuclear energy plants to be switched off “for the 
time being” for three months.2 At the same time, she revoked 
the decision approved by the German Parliament on 28 Sep-
tember 2010 to extend the operational lifetime of nuclear 
plants by an average of 12 years relative to the moratorium 
plan promulgated in 2002 by the Social Democrat/Green 
Party coalition government. To that effect, she installed an 
ethics commission that has to submit a report with a pro-
posed date for the complete demise of German nuclear pow-
er generation. According to leaked information, this will be 
no later than ten years from now, i.e. by 2021. At the time of 
writing this article, the governments of the other 14 EU mem-
2 Der Spiegel: Das war’s!, No. 14, 2011, pp. 62-72.
In the last few years before the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
which started to unfold on 11 March 2011, support for the 
nuclear power option was picking up in several EU member 
states. New nuclear power plants are currently being built in 
Finland, France, Bulgaria and other countries; the UK, Swe-
den, Italy, Czech Republic, Romania and the Netherlands 
were seriously considering new nuclear reactors, while in 
Germany, Spain and Belgium a relaxation of the existing 
moratorium was under political discussion. The commission 
chaired by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales 
advising the European Council on the future of Europe stat-
ed:
“The search for a more viable energy mix must also involve 
recourse to nuclear energy. Europe cannot afford to relin-
quish this important source of power, but unlocking invest-
ments in nuclear energy requires a greater level of regula-
tory certainty, as well as the further development of safety 
standards.”1
1 F. G o n z á l e s  M á rq u e s  et al.: Project Europe 2030. Challenges and 
Opportunities, Report to the European Council by the refl ection group 
on the future of Europe 2030, May 2010.
Intereconomics 2011 | 3
138
Forum
ber states with operating nuclear energy plants did not go 
further than to announce ad hoc audits that should integrate 
the lessons learnt from Fukushima. Yet among the remaining 
member states without operating nuclear reactors, Italy has 
put the intended reintroduction of nuclear power generation 
capacity on hold.
This article presents a preliminary qualitative assessment of 
a fast phase-out of nuclear electricity capacity and a tran-
sition towards a largely (80%+) renewable electricity supply 
sector in Germany and the greater EU. The focus is on the 
associated costs and the feasibility of the envisioned tran-
sition towards a completely renewables-based electricity 
supply sector. Special attention is paid to Germany as this 
country is pioneering an Energiewende (a fast transition to-
wards a renewables-based energy economy). Moreover, it 
has a large power sector accounting for about 30% of EU 
power demand. The article is structured as follows. First, 
three politically important scenario studies are briefl y intro-
duced which have developed (among others) scenarios for 
an 80%+ renewable power sector in Germany and the EU by 
2050. Next, the most important conditions for making such 
scenarios come true are reviewed. Finally, the major conse-
quences of a political decision to introduce or speed up a 
nuclear moratorium in EU member states will be addressed. 
The article closes with conclusions.
Making Power More Renewable: Some Scenarios
To date, the most relevant scenarios for energy policy for-
mulation in Germany are the scenario study3 underlying the 
Energy Concept policy document4 of the German govern-
ment and a study commissioned by the Federal Ministry of 
the Enviroment in 2010 (Pilot Study 2010).5
The scenario study for the Energy Concept develops target 
scenarios for reducing GHG emissions in Germany by 85% 
by 2050 relative to 1990. Moreover, in the target scenarios, 
primary energy demand and electricity demand in 2050 rela-
tive to the base year 2008 are to be reduced by more than 
50% and by 20-25% respectively. In the target scenarios, 
renewable-based electricity, including substantial renewable 
electricity imports, are to account for around 80% of gross 
electricity demand by 2050. By then, an important non-re-
newable power component would be coal-based power in 
CHP (combined heat and power) mode with CCS (carbon 
capture and storage). Some of the major points envisaged by 
the aforementioned target scenarios include the following:
3 Prognos/EWI/GWS: Studie Energieszenarien für ein Energiekonzept 
der Bundesregierung, Basel/Köln/Osnabrück, August 2010. 
4 Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Energiekonzept, BMWI/BMU, Berlin, 
28 September 2010.
5 DLR/Fraunhofer IWES/IfrE: Leitstudie 2010, Study commissioned by 
BMU, December 2010. 
• Wholesale electricity prices in 2050 will be in the order of 
€20-30/MWh6 as opposed to spot prices which currently 
oscillate within the €55-65/MWh range. Saharan solar 
power will exert a substantial downward effect on whole-
sale power prices, especially during the mid-day peak 
hours.
• In 2050 the unit cost of electricity (generation cost only) 
will be about €15/MWh higher than in 2008. The major 
reason for the increase is the expansion of renewable 
electricity generation.
• Offshore wind will be the renewable option providing the 
largest contribution to the increase in renewable electric-
ity generation, with other – e.g. biomass-based – options 
being constrained by factors such as biomass or land 
availability.
• In Germany photovoltaics (PV) will not become economi-
cally feasible by 2050 in spite of learning curve effects. 
Feeding in at lower network voltage levels hardly saves 
network costs, as these are more than 90% determined 
by fi xed costs.
• The EEG Umlage (surcharge on the household electric-
ity bill to pay for the extra costs of renewable electricity 
stimulation by the German feed-in tariff system) will be 
approximately €0.04/kWh in 2050.
• The household electricity price in 2050 will be ap-
proximately €0.22/kWh, i.e. broadly the same level as at 
present.
The Pilot Study 2010 analyses renewables-dominated en-
ergy futures for Germany through 2050. One of the scenarios 
presented in this study projects a 100% renewable-based 
power supply sector. Its baseline demographic, structural 
and economic assumptions correspond largely to the ones 
used in the Energy Concept scenario study. As a result of 
assumed increasing primary energy productivity, electricity 
is to gradually diminish through 2030 and level off thereafter 
through 2050. Hence the reduction in power demand from 
2008 to 2050 in the Pilot Study 2010 scenarios is much less 
than in the Energy Concept target scenarios. According to 
the Pilot Study, power demand by “new uses” such as elec-
tric vehicles, heat pumps and air conditioning are bound to 
largely offset electric energy effi ciency improvements. In the 
100% renewable electricity scenario, hydrogen production 
for electricity storage purposes would even push total elec-
tricity demand in an upward direction. Balancing options to 
be implemented for stabilising the electricity system include: 
(1) grid extensions, (2) the provision of new storage capaci-
ties, and (3) generation and load management. Controlla-
ble renewable power such as biomass, including biomass 
for fl exible CHP (with heat or gas storage opportunities), 
pumped-storage and H
2-powered plants as well as inter-
6 Unless otherwise stated, monetary values mentioned in this article 
are “real”, i.e. not including future price infl ation.  
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national electricity exchanges, are primarily to be used for 
load management. Because of the high share of intermittent 
renewable generation with priority grid access, the need for 
base-load power plants is set to diminish. Generation costs 
of renewables-based electricity in Germany would come 
down from €0.14/kWh in 2011 to €0.06/kWh in 2050. Note 
that transmission and distribution costs are not included in 
these amounts. Given projected trends, within the period 
2025-2032, all-renewables power generation would become 
cheaper than power generation according to the baseline 
scenario, i.e. a scenario in which conventional power still 
makes up an appreciable share.
At the time of writing, the European Commission has not yet 
presented scenarios with a time horizon as far off as 2050.7 
Therefore we now briefl y discuss Roadmap 2050 scenarios 
with a largely renewable-based European power supply sec-
tor based on a study prepared by a well-regarded source, the 
European Climate Foundation (ECF).8 The study concerned 
uses as its point of departure an 80% CO2 reduction in the 
EU9 by 2050 relative to 1990. This equates to a 95-100% 
non-CO2 electricity generation mix. The “pathways” (back-
casting target scenarios) considered include ones with a 
40%, 60% and 80% renewable electricity share (RES). The 
non-renewable shares are assumed to be equally divided 
between fossil fuels with CCS and nuclear power. At the EU 
level, power demand is set to grow by about 40% from 2005 
to 2050 under low carbon pathway conditions. This is similar 
to the Roadmap 2050 baseline scenario without intensifi ed 
climate change policy: extra energy effi ciency improvements 
would be offset by extra demand for electricity due to “new 
uses” such as electric vehicles and space heating by electric 
heat pumps. The ECF study concludes that if the presumed 
framework conditions were met, the cost of electricity for the 
three low-carbon pathways could be 10-15% higher than 
the baseline excluding carbon pricing. At a carbon price of 
€20-30/tCO2eq, the cost of electricity of the three low carbon 
pathways and under the baseline scenario would be roughly 
the same. However, the overall cost of energy would decline 
by 20-30% relative to the baseline, due primarily to greater 
energy effi ciency and a shift from oil and gas to decarbon-
ised electricity in transport and buildings. If a low carbon 
pathway of 100% electricity from renewable sources in the 
electricity mix were to be pursued, this would be feasible 
technically and at a cost of probably only 5-10% more than 
the 60% RES pathway.
7 The European Commission communication: Energy 2020, a strategy 
for competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM(2010)639 fi nal. 
Brussels, 10 November 2010, falls short of presenting detailed sce-
nario results.
8 EFC: ROADMAP 2050, practical guide to a prosperous, low-carbon 
Europe, Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, April 2010.
9 Apart from the EU27, Norway and Switzerland are also included.
General Framework for High Renewable Power 
Scenarios
The three studies reviewed all come with an invariably happy 
message: end-user electricity prices will hardly rise or (e.g. 
according to the Pilot Study 2010) may even fall if a high en-
ergy effi ciency (EE) cum renewable (RES) power scenario is 
adopted to support long-term energy policy. A moratorium 
on nuclear energy would not materially affect this forecasted 
upshot. This “happy news” is compounded by some of the 
major benefi ts an EE/RES scenario has relative to a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario:
• carbon emissions will decrease by substantially higher 
amounts;
• supply security will be much greater as dependency on 
imported fossil fuels from politically less stable coun-
tries will decrease markedly;
• electricity prices will become more stable;
• innovation will lead to job creation.
Some qualifying remarks can be made concerning the pre-
sumed general framework. First, let’s examine some of the 
major conditions. Future prices of coal and natural gas will 
have a major impact on the future fuel mix in the electric-
ity sector. Rising fuel prices improve the competitiveness of 
both nuclear and renewable energy. Future fuel prices are 
surrounded by great uncertainty, yet it would seem likely 
that strong long-term upward trends for fossil fuel prices are 
in the offi ng. For supply to meet fast increasing non-OECD 
demand, marginal supply has to come from increasingly ex-
pensive sources. Regarding the market for internationally 
traded coal, it is often overlooked that supply concentration 
is quite high. Countries with major coal resources, such as 
the USA, China and India, need virtually all their production 
to meet their domestic demand. As for gas, non-conventional 
gas is often touted as a “game changer”. Indeed, current gas 
prices are somewhat depressed, though it is a distinct possi-
bility that this situation could last for only a few years. A major 
reason for this is that gas is the fossil fuel of choice due to its 
fairly moderate environmental impact – including its carbon 
emissions impact – compared to coal. Moreover, the invest-
ment costs of gas-based power plants are low, while their 
construction period is short.
Therefore, it would seem prudent for scenario developers to 
assume quickly rising fuel prices as well as a high correlation 
among oil, gas and coal prices, i.e. the rise in coal prices will 
not be substantially less steep than the others. Table 1 shows 
the assumptions made for the scenarios introduced above. 
The price paths A of the Pilot Study 2010 would seem most 
appropriate. The Roadmap 2050’s reliance on IEA fi gures for 
coal seems rather off the mark, as the coal market in coal-im-
porting Europe is quite different from non-Europe OECD.
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Second, apart from large hydro and a few biomass power 
generation technologies in limited biomass-rich regions, re-
newable power technologies cannot yet compete on a com-
mercial basis with conventional sources for grid electricity. 
This may well change for a variety of renewable generation 
technologies as a result of technological learning. In all high-
RES scenarios for the future power supply in Germany and 
Europe, the key technology that is forecasted as the larg-
est domestic contributor to incremental renewable power 
generation is offshore wind. Should the forecasted growth 
of power generation from offshore wind not materialise, 
then the goal of an electricity mix including 80%+ renewable 
electricity by 2050 will be very hard to achieve.
Table 2 shows key assumptions regarding the future cost 
evolution of electricity from offshore wind. The offshore 
wind running cost assumptions made by the two German 
studies seem reasonable, as experts point to a large scope 
for economies of scale and technological learning in the 
operation of offshore wind parks. In contrast, the assumed 
investment costs of €1300-1350/kW in 2050 would seem 
rather (overly) optimistic, even with the sharing of seaborne 
connecting cables, as opposed to the more realistic €1900-
2300/kW assumed by Roadmap 2050. Material inputs such 
as steel, copper and rare earths such as neodymium pro-
vide a solid lower limit to the level of cost reductions that can 
be achieved. Moreover, with the number of offshore wind 
parks increasing, locations for new parks will be further from 
shore and in deeper waters, which escalates total invest-
ment cost. We note that optimistic “learning” assumptions 
like the ones described have a large impact on the results of 
“happy news” scenarios on long-term energy futures.
Third, all three studies assume an EU-wide stringent climate 
policy resulting in clearly rising carbon prices. High carbon 
prices favourably affect the competitiveness of both nucle-
ar and renewable power. Indeed, the EU emissions trading 
system is a precious instrument to be retained and further 
strengthened in order to cost-effectively render the Europe-
an economy less carbon-intensive. Yet the political feasibil-
ity of a stringent European climate policy strongly depends 
on whether or not credible climate policies are introduced 
elsewhere in the world as well.
Fourth, another common assumption is that massive in-
vestment in expansion (by roughly a factor of three by 2050 
compared to what is currently in place) and closer integra-
tion of the transmission networks in the EU and the Magh-
reb occurs.10 This is a diffi cult condition, both in terms of 
the fi nancial requirements and implementation efforts. 
As the Roadmap 2050 study rightly points out, in order to 
achieve energy transitions to low-carbon power systems, 
such as 80% renewable power systems, there is no time to 
lose in quickly reinforcing European electricity networks. 
However, the EU-wide BANANA11 syndrome is exerting a 
strongly negative impact on transmission network expan-
10 This is absolutely necessary to address the system stability issue, 
given a fast increase of intermittent renewable electricity such as 
wind power in particular but also PV and wave power. Moreover, it 
enables cost-reducing competition between a multitude of Europe-
an suppliers and generation technologies as well as the location of 
renewable power at sites with the lowest-cost resources in Europe 
(e.g. wind power in Western Europe, solar power in Southern Europe 
and the Maghreb, and bio power especially in Central and Eastern 
Europe).
11 Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone.
Table 1
Assumed Price of Coal and Natural Gas in the 
Scenarios Considered
(€/MWh)
a US $1 = €0.704. Figures are based on the IEA World Energy Outlook 
2009; b Figures for year 2009.
S o u rc e s : Prognos/EWI/GWS: Studie Energieszenarien für ein Ener-
giekonzept der Bundesregierung, Basel/Köln/Osnabrück, August 2010; 
DLR/Fraunhofer IWES/IfrE: Leitstudie 2010, Study commissioned by 
BMU, December 2010; EFC: ROADMAP 2050, practical guide to a pros-
perous, low-carbon Europe, Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, April 2010.
Table 2
Assumed Parameter Values for Cost of Electricity 
from Offshore Wind
a Figures for 2020.
S o u rc e s : Prognos/EWI/GWS: Studie Energieszenarien für ein Ener-
giekonzept der Bundesregierung, Basel/Köln/Osnabrück, August 2010; 
DLR/Fraunhofer IWES/IfrE: Leitstudie 2010, Study commissioned by 
BMU, December 2010; EFC: ROADMAP 2050, practical guide to a pros-
perous, low-carbon Europe, Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, April 2010.
2008 2030 2050
Coal
Scenarios for Energy Concept 17.3 10.8 14.0
Pilot Study 2010: path A 13.7 23.4 33.1
Roadmap 2050a 6.1b 7.9 9.4
Gas
Scenarios for Energy Concept 25.2 25.9 31.7
Pilot Study 2010: path A 26.3 49.7 69.1
Roadmap 2050a 21.4b 25.2 35.6
2010 2030 2050
Investment cost 
(€/kW)
Scenarios for Energy 
Concept 
2400a 1670 1350
Pilot Study 2010 3300 1800 1300
Roadmap 2050
3000
-3600
2000
-2400
1900 
- 2300
Running cost 
(€/kW-year)
Scenarios for Energy 
Concept 
132a 92 74
Pilot Study 2010 182 99 72
Roadmap 2050 80-100 80-100 80-100
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sion. For example, the current expansion of the German 
transmission network falls seriously short of what the Ger-
man Energy Agency (DENA) has identifi ed as necessary to 
accommodate the expansion of wind power capacity. This 
will increase not only the volume of forced curtailment be-
cause of network constraints but also the risks of lesser net-
work security in Germany and neighbouring countries. On 
the other hand, allowable returns on network investments in 
Germany in the order of 7% per annum do not encourage 
private-sector investors such as pension funds to allot eq-
uity capital to new network expansion projects. To solve the 
implementation problems in a timely manner, if at all pos-
sible, large budget overruns are likely. Furthermore, massive 
investments are needed to reinforce electricity distribution 
networks, enabling bi-directional power fl ows.
Fifth, it is assumed that the use of intelligent networks will 
become a common operational practice. These are badly 
needed to cope with network stability issues in the face of 
the high penetration of intermittent renewable power. Again 
massive fi nancial investment is required for ICT hardware 
and software, the upgrading of networks as well as human 
capital. Additionally, wide-ranging European harmonisation 
in network regulation and regulatory reforms have to be put 
in place, enabling e.g. time-dependent end-user tariffs, also 
for households, and time- and location-dependent market 
stimulation of renewable power. For example, regulators 
might consider stimulating renewable power only during 
hours in which non-negative electricity wholesale prices 
occur and at locations where no network congestion takes 
place. Furthermore, in countries where renewable power 
commands a non-negligible share of the electricity mix, pri-
ority rules for renewable power can negatively affect market 
effi ciency. For example, in these respects the German feed-
in tariff system is strongly at odds with the introduction of 
“smart grids”.
Finally, the emergence of a truly EU-wide electricity mar-
ket is assumed. Similar to and contingent upon robust and 
strongly interconnected transmission networks, this is to 
enable price-reducing competition throughout the EU. Ad-
ditionally, it helps to facilitate exports during times of peak 
production by intermittent renewable power plants and, 
conversely, cross-border imports at times of low domestic 
production by such plants. It is indispensible that, as as-
sumed in the German study on scenarios for the Energy 
Concept, a transition will occur towards a technology-neu-
tral renewable electricity support system that is harmonised 
throughout the EU. The assumed continuation of the Ger-
man feed-in tariff system in the Pilot Study 2010 will hinder 
cost-reducing competition between renewable technolo-
gies and the EU-wide location of renewable power plants 
at the sites with the lowest-cost renewable resources. The 
consequence of the latter assumption becoming a reality 
would be a dramatic rise in the costs necessary to achieve 
an 80%+ renewable electricity supply system.
What Will Be the Consequences of a Nuclear 
Moratorium?
As already noted, the German government was remarkably 
fast in concluding that the Fukushima incident presented 
suffi cient critical evidence to repeal a recent decision to ex-
tend the lifetime of the 17 existing German nuclear reactors 
and to consider an accelerated moratorium. The website of 
the BMU, the German ministry responsible for nuclear reac-
tor safety, explains that the Fukushima accident denotes a 
game-changing event for Japan and the whole world. The 
BMU concludes that it has changed the security situation 
for German nuclear reactors, as the unfolding Fukushima 
accidents have shown that (catastrophic) events can occur 
beyond what is foreseen in the currently considered scenar-
ios.12 Many researchers corroborate this BMU reasoning, ar-
guing that Fukushima demonstrates that the residual risk of 
a nuclear catastrophe leading to radioactive contamination 
of the environment as a result of a nuclear reactor meltdown 
is much higher than was generally assumed beforehand.13 
We shall avoid the question of whether this reasoning is 
true or not. We consider instead the consequences of intro-
ducing a(n accelerated) nuclear moratorium in EU member 
states or at the EU level.
In the medium and long term, the world is poised to face 
severe constraints throughout the entire energy supply sec-
tor. This will not only affect the supply of fossil fuels with 
concomitant rising fossil fuel prices. Renewable electricity 
and other renewable energy carriers will also face stringent 
supply limitations.14 If this scenario holds true, as I believe it 
will, what would be the consequences of a European mora-
torium on nuclear power and a strong push towards achiev-
ing an 80%+ renewable power supply sector by 2050?
12 See http://www.bmu.de/moratorium/doc/47140.php: Fragen und Ant-
worten zur Sicherheitsüberprüfung aller Deutschen Kernkraftwerke, 
download 22 May 2011.
13 Marcel Viëtor explains the German acronyms “GAU” and “super-
GAU” for such incidents in his article dated 17 March 2011 on the 
website of the European Energy Review, http://www.europeanener-
gyreview.eu: Assumptions and accidents. He concludes that a super-
GAU remains thinkable and questions whether governments and 
societies in the EU are willing to accept this risk. In answering this 
question, the European public has a right to unbiased information on 
whether the events in Chernobyl and Fukushima have had a mate-
rial impact on expert opinions on the residential risk of nuclear reac-
tors in the EU. As for Fukushima, there are still a lot of questions e.g. 
about nuclear safety supervision and implementation performance 
regarding severe accident precautionary measures that remain to be 
answered. 
14 P. M o r t i a r y, D. H o n n e r y : Is there an optimum level for renewable 
energy?, in: Energy Policy, Vol. 39, 2011, pp. 2748-2753.
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A moratorium on nuclear power would reduce and eventually 
remove the residual risk factor of exposing the European peo-
ples to nuclear contamination as a result of accidents with 
nuclear reactor meltdowns within EU territory. It is a political 
choice whether this benefi t should be pursued or not. Yet it 
should be realised that a nuclear moratorium comes at an 
economic price. A nuclear moratorium would further tighten 
the supply constraints of the European electricity supply sec-
tor. This is even more the case if the pursuit of ambitious Eu-
ropean GHG reduction policy targets such as an 80% GHG 
reduction by 2050 are continued. Many authoritative publica-
tions by organisations such as the IEA and its NEA subsidiary 
indicate that the full costs of nuclear electricity are relatively 
low, even when factoring in investment cost escalation, rea-
sonable costs for decommissioning, disposal of spent fuel 
and a fair premium for residual risk. Hence discarding the nu-
clear energy option has a non-negligible upward impact on 
the cost of electricity, which is already likely to rise anyway.
Furthermore, a moratorium acceleration which entails the 
premature decommission of some reactors before they have 
served out their economic lifetimes would typically result in 
a multi-billion euro amount of capital destruction. Conse-
quently, nuclear operators would be negatively affected. As 
an alternative, governments could appropriate a substantive 
portion of the capital saved by avoiding the acceleration of a 
moratorium via case-specifi c taxation. This money could help 
to foot the staggering bill of energy transition implementation.
Concluding Remarks
An 80%+ carbon reduction in the power sector by 2050 will 
require a combination of:
• fossil fuels-based power generation with CCS;
• a shift from coal to gas;
• a signifi cant reduction in the demand for electricity, cou-
pled with an even stronger reduction in the demand for 
non-electric energy;
• the fast penetration of renewable power;
• a signifi cant contribution from nuclear power.
None of these options can be dismissed if stringent carbon 
reduction targets are to be achieved. Apart from CCS, which 
has its own implementation problems and still needs to prove 
its viability, a shift from coal to gas in the power sector can 
offer only moderate carbon reduction. Furthermore, a more 
prominent role for gas in the electricity mix will increase Eu-
rope’s dependence on gas imports. Yet even with a renew-
able share in the electricity mix, a role for gas in balancing the 
electricity system remains likely.
Further electrifi cation of the European energy economy can 
have important benefi ts in terms of making our society more 
energy-effi cient and consequently carbon-effi cient. The 
penetration of electric vehicles, including plug-in hybrids, 
and effi cient heat pumps for space heating will impact nega-
tively on primary energy demand. Moreover, the production 
of hydrogen through electrolysis may eventually help to ad-
dress the problem of managing electricity system stability. 
Nonetheless, the severe energy constraints looming at the 
world level and the climate change problem render technical 
fi xes in the way of energy effi ciency-boosting measures very 
necessary but still insuffi cient. Hence, an absolute reduc-
tion in total electricity demand and more importantly in total 
energy demand at large would seem a quite appropriate top 
energy policy target for affl uent OECD societies. Therefore, 
as such, the German energy policy targets as outlined in the 
Energy Concept are laudable. 
However, the scenario analyses underlying this policy docu-
ment suggest that the reduction targets for electricity can 
be achieved without any increase in end-user electricity 
prices. This is a less credible outcome. To bring about the 
drastic lifestyle changes that will be necessary to achieve 
the Energy Concept targets for electricity and energy reduc-
tion, end-user electricity and non-electric energy prices will 
have to go up substantially. Politicians and energy policy 
researchers in Europe had better begin informing the gen-
eral public that the days of cheap energy are most probably 
gone.
The goal of achieving the fast penetration of renewable elec-
tricity in the electricity mix deserves a high energy policy pri-
ority. Renewable energy, including renewable electricity, has 
some innate advantages apart from carbon reduction that 
are worthy of dedicated energy policy attention. Yet achiev-
ing 80%+ renewable electricity by the 2050 target date will 
add much more to the electricity bill than the results of the 
energy scenario analyses considered in this article would 
lead us to believe. Moreover, real world inertia renders this 
target hardly implementable at all. An EU-wide renewable 
electricity target in the order of 40-50% by 2050 would seem 
more realistic and affordable while still quite ambitious.
If nuclear energy were to be removed as a politically non-
feasible option, this would make the achievement of ambi-
tious European climate change targets all the more expen-
sive. More over, it would boost imports of natural gas and 
coal, which is at odds with the political goal of improving 
the security of supply. It is up to the political domain in the 
EU and its member states to weigh these economic aspects 
against the intrinsic disadvantages of nuclear power, includ-
ing the residual risk issue. The availability of impartial, non-
politicised information on the pros and cons regarding the 
nuclear power option should assist a fair debate, ultimately 
leading to well-reasoned outcomes of the political decision 
process.
